PATRICHEEV Iurie PhD Student at the Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands. (Amsterdam, Netherlands).

Email: iuriepatricheev @gmail.com

Keywords: corruption, systemic corruption, European integration, transparency, Klitgaard’s formula, anti-corruption reforms.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the development of hybrid regimes, systemic corruption has become a pervasive obstacle to liberal democratisation. This paper revisits Klitgaard’s formula and argues that the model should incorporate the level of public officials’ wages to capture the reality in the Republic of Moldova. Drawing on jurisprudential insights from Hohfeld’s framework and comparative modifications of Klitgaard’s theory, it highlights how low salaries and opaque income declarations undermine the system, fuel discretionary abuse, and perpetuate monopolistic power structures. Using a hypothetical case of a Moldovan police officer, the study aims at showcasing how inadequate remuneration incentivises ‘grey’ income schemes and deepens systemic flaws. The author proposes a package of reforms: competitive salaries paired with leased government housing paid via payroll deductions, comprehensive public asset declarations, and enhanced criminal sanctions for corruption tied to EU benchmarks. By rebalancing Klitgaard’s formula, this approach aims to curb decision-making monopolies, bolster transparency, and reverse brain drain. The essay concludes that, alongside broader legal and institutional measures, strategic wage adjustments can change corruption’s position from a structural norm into a managed exception.